



# Preservation of Semantic Properties during the Aggregation of Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

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# Outline

When a group of agents are engaged in a debate, they may disagree on many details. Meanwhile, they may agree on high-level ideas.


How should we model such scenarios?

- we formulate a model for the study of aggregation of AFs
- we define several semantic properties
- we study the interaction of semantic properties, aggregation rules and its properties

## Background: Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

An abstract *argumentation framework (AF)* is a pair  $AF = \langle \text{Arg}, \rightarrow \rangle$ , where,

- Arg is a finite set of *arguments*
- $\rightarrow$  is an irreflexive binary *attack-relation* on Arg



A is **not** attacked by any argument, B is *attacked* by A, C, D *attack* each other.

P.M. Dung. On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Fundamental Role in NMR, LP and  $n$ -Person Games. *Artificial Intelligence*, 77(2):321-357, 1995.

## Background: Semantics

Given an AF, we say that  $\Delta \subseteq \text{Arg}$  is:

- *conflict-free* if there exist no arguments  $A, B \in \Delta$  such that  $A \rightarrow B$
- a *grounded extension* if it is the least fixed point of the characteristic function of AF

**Terminology:** The *characteristic function* of AF is the function  $f_{AF} : 2^{\text{Arg}} \rightarrow 2^{\text{Arg}}$  with  $f_{AF} : \Delta \mapsto \{A \in \text{Arg} \mid \Delta \text{ defends } A\}$ .

Other semantics: *stable* extension, *preferred* extension, *complete* extension, etc.

## Collective Argumentation

Fix a set of *arguments*. Given  $n$  *agents* and a *profile* of attack relations  $\rightarrow = (\rightarrow_1, \dots, \rightarrow_n)$ . How should we *aggregate* this information?

## Semantic Properties

What AF-properties are preserved under aggregation?


We are interested in *semantic properties* such as:

- *acyclicity*
- *nonemptiness* of the grounded extension
- $\Delta \subseteq \text{Arg}$  *being an extension* (according to a given semantics)


So, in case all agents agree on one of them being satisfied, we would like to see it preserved under aggregation.

## Example


Let  $F$  be the *majority rule*. Consider the following example:




$AF_1$



$AF_2$



$AF_3$



$F(\rightarrow)$

Observations:

- *acyclicity* is not preserved
- *nonemptiness* of the grounded extension is preserved

But does the latter result hold in general?

## Preservation of Conflict-Freeness

**Theorem 1** Every aggregation rule  $F$  that is *grounded* preserves *conflict-freeness*.

### Proof Idea

- no grounded aggregation rule would *invent* an attack between two arguments

**Terminology**: an aggregation rule  $F$  is called *grounded* if  $F(\rightarrow_1, \dots, \rightarrow_n) \subseteq (\rightarrow_1) \cup \dots \cup (\rightarrow_n)$  for every profile  $\rightarrow$ .



## Preservation of Grounded Extensions

**Theorem 2** For  $|\text{Arg}| \geq 5$ , any unanimous, grounded, neutral, and independent aggregation rule  $F$  that preserves *grounded extensions* must be a *dictatorship*.

### Proof Idea

- the proof of this theorem makes use of a technique developed by Endriss and Grandi for graph aggregation which is a generalisation of Arrow's seminal result for preference aggregation

U. Endriss and U. Grandi. Graph Aggregation. *Artificial Intelligence*, 245:86–114, 2017.

K.J. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., John Wiley and Sons, 1963.  
First edition published in 1951.

## Preservation of Acyclicity

Acyclicity is associated with the existence of a *single extension*.

**Theorem 3** If  $|\text{Arg}| \geq n$ , then under any neutral and independent aggregation rule  $F$  that preserves *acyclicity* at least one agent must have *veto powers*.

### Proof Idea

- the proof of this theorem relies on a result for a more general property which we call  $k$ -exclusiveness
- acyclicity is a  $k$ -exclusive property

**Terminology:** Agent  $i \in N$  has *veto powers* under aggregation rule  $F$ , if  $F(\rightarrow) \subseteq (\rightarrow_i)$  for every profile  $\rightarrow$ .

## Preservation Results

Property	Rule(s)
Argument acceptability (Holds for all four semantics)	dictatorships
Conflict-freeness	all grounded rules
Admissibility	nomination rule
Grounded extension	dictatorships
Stable extension	nomination rule
Coherence	dictatorships
Nonempty of the GE	veto rules
Acyclicity	veto rules

## Summary

In this talk, we have:

- defined a model for aggregation of AFs
- defined desirable semantic properties of AFs
- drawn a picture of the capabilities and limitations of aggregation of AFs

Things that could be done in the future:

- study the preservation of preferred and complete extensions
- study further semantic properties of AFs, going beyond the four classical semantics
- ...